Data usage control enables data owners to enforce policies over how their data may be used after they have been released and accessed. We address distributed aspects of this problem, which arise if the protected data reside within multiple systems. We contribute by formalizing, implementing, and evaluating a fully decentralized system that (i) generically and transparently tracks protected data across systems, (ii) propagates data usage policies along, and (iii) efficiently and preventively enforces policies in a decentralized manner. The evaluation shows that (i) dataflow tracking and policy propagation achieve a throughput of 21-54% of native execution and (ii) decentralized policy enforcement outperforms a centralized approach in many situations.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the ever-increasing value of data, their continuous protection becomes ever more important. Corresponding solutions are applicable in many contexts, such as business, military, and government secrets, as well as privacy and copyright protection. In all these cases, the owners of valuable data would like to constrain their future usage.
Data usage control solutions (Park and Sandhu 2004; Pretschner et al. 2006 ) allow for the specification and enforcement of policies expressing propositional, temporal, cardinal, and spatial constraints on future data usages. Different to traditional access control, these policies are enforced even after access was granted.
Reference monitors ensure, or observe, policy compliance by continuously intercepting and monitoring relevant events. Because data constitute an abstraction which materializes in different forms, such as files or database entries, reference monitors must (i) record the flow of data through the system and (ii) enforce or observe policy compliance for all of the recorded data representations ). In the following, policy enforcement refers to both detective and preventive enforcement.
System Events and System
Traces. Events E are defined by a name (set N ) and a set of parameters, which are, in turn, defined by a name (set N ) and a value (set V): E ⊆ N × P(N × V). For an event e ∈ E, let e.n denote its name and e.p its set of parameters. We write (e.n, {(p 1 , v 1 ), . . . , (p m , v m )}) for the event e ∈ E with m ∈ N parameters (p 1 , v 1 ), . . . , (p m , v m ) ∈ N × V.
Each event carries two mandatory parameters, obj, actual ∈ N , which we refer to as e.obj and e.actual: e.obj denotes the primary object of e, such as a file; e.actual is Boolean: e.actual = true indicates that event e has already happened, while e.actual = false indicates that event e is intended. Hence, we obtain two subsets of E, actual events E A def = {e ∈ E | e.actual} and intended events E I def = E \ E A . As an example event, consider a system call that is initiated by an application and executed by the OS kernel.
Events might be data usage events E U or dataflow events E F . The former process data, while the latter cause data to migrate between representations. There might exist events that belong to both sets at the same time, hence E U ∩ E F ∅.
For example, event e r = (review, {(obj, d), (actual, true) , (role, clerk)}) ∈ E denotes that a user with role clerk actually reviews data d, hence e r ∈ E A . Intuitively, reviewing is considered data usage, hence e r ∈ E A ∩ E U ; e r also is a dataflow event if the implementation is such that e r leads to the creation of a new representation of d.
Event refinement. When specifying policies (Section 2.1.3), it is useful to specify only relevant event parameters, quantifying over unmentioned ones. Hence, ref ⊆ E × E defines a refinement relation: Event e 1 refines event e 2 iff their names are the same and iff the parameters of e 1 are a superset of those of e 2 : ∀e 1 , e 2 ∈ E : e 1 ref e 2 def ⇐⇒ e 1 .n = e 2 .n ∧ e 1 .p ⊇ e 2 .p.
System events S are events that are observed at runtime. They are maximally refined, i.e., all parameters are determined: S def = {e ∈ E | e ∈ E : e e ∧ e ref e}. We categorize system events S into actual system events S A def = E A ∩ S, intended system events S I def = E I ∩ S, data usage system events S U def = E U ∩ S, and dataflow system events S F def = E F ∩ S. We further define
Parameter time ∈ N indicates the event's time of observation: ∀e ∈ S ∃r ∈ R ≥0 : (time, r ) ∈ e.p. We access r by e.time.
Traces T model system runs by mapping abstract points in time i ∈ N to all system events that happened since i − 1:
T : N → P(S), such that ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ N, i > 0, ∀e ∈ t (i) : i − 1 < e.time ≤ i. 
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We assume that no two events happen at exactly the same point in time:
∀t ∈ T, i ∈ N, e 1 , e 2 ∈ t (i) : e 1 .time = e 2 .time ⇒ e 1 = e 2 .
Generic Dataflow Model and System
States. At runtime the data to be protected exist in multiple, continuously evolving, representations. The system's dataflow state captures which data take which representations at which point in time. A dataflow model ) (over-)approximates these data representations. Dataflow events S F initiate state transitions.
Within this model, D is the set of data to be protected. Representations containing data are called containers, denoted by C, and D ∩ C = ∅. D, C and special value nil constitute possible values for event parameter obj: ∀e ∈ E, ∃v ∈ D ∪ C ∪ {nil} : e.obj = v. Identifiers I identify containers. In practice, system events carry parameters that allow to identify the container on which the event operates.
The set of all possible dataflow states is defined as Σ def = s × a × n. Each state consists of three mappings: (1) A storage function s : C → P(D) capturing which containers potentially store which data. (2) An alias function a : C → P(C) capturing that some containers may implicitly get updated whenever other containers do: If c 2 ∈ a(c 1 ) for c 1 , c 2 ∈ C, then any data written into c 1 are immediately propagated to c 2 . (3) A naming function n : I → C mapping identifiers to containers. For a state σ ∈ Σ, σ .s, σ .a, and σ .n refer to those mappings. The initial state of trace t ∈ Tis denoted σ 0 t .
Transition relation R ⊆ Σ × S
A F × Σ defines how the above state changes in correspondence with the execution of actual dataflow system events S A F . Given a state σ ∈ Σ and a set of events S ∈ {S ⊆ S A F | ∀e, e ∈ S : e.time = e .time ⇒ e = e }, function R : Σ × P(S A F ) → Σ updates the dataflow state: ∀σ ∈ Σ, S ∈ S ⊆ S A F | ∀e, e ∈ S : e.time = e .time ⇒ e = e : R (σ , S ) def = σ if S = ∅ R (R (σ , e), S \ {e}) for e ∈ S : e ∈ S : e .time < e.time.
For trace t ∈ Tand timestep i ∈ N, the set of system events causing dataflows is t (i) ∩ S A F . Thus, the system's state at the end of timestep i ∈ N, i > 0, is computed as σ i t def = R (σ i−1 t , t (i) ∩ S A F ). Instantiations of this model, including semantics of R, exist, among others, for Unix ), X11 , and Microsoft Windows (Wüchner and Pretschner 2012) . On their application at runtime, storage function σ .s reflects at each point in time which data reside in which containers.
In the insurance company example, D represents the set of all customer data, contracts, and the insurance's business secrets. Containers C are, e.g., workstations, emails, files, database records, and data processing software. This clear distinction between abstract data (D) and their concrete technical representations (C) allows for flexible and generic dataflow tracking by means of updating their mapping (σ .s) in correspondence with observed system events (S). 1 Section 3.2 instantiates this model for processes, files, and sockets (C) and system calls (S). Further, state transitions (R) for system calls are defined to model how system calls propagate data between containers, thereby modifying σ .s.
12:6 F. Kelbert and A. Pretschner Relation ref Σ ⊆ (S × Σ) × E describes event refinement in the presence of a given state. The rationale is that system events S always operate on containers, while policies (Section 2.1.3) might be specified in terms of data. Hence, state σ ∈ Σ determines whether an event refines another: (e 1 , σ ) refines e 2 if either both e 1 and e 2 operate on the same container and if e 1 ref e 2 , or if e 1 operates on some container c ∈ C and e 2 operates on some data d ∈ D within c (d ∈ σ .s(c )) and e 1 ref e 2 when ignoring parameter obj:
On this basis, Section 2.1.3 defines the syntax and semantics of data usage policies.
Specification of Data Usage Policies.
We specify policies using the Obligation Specification Language (OSL), an extension of linear temporal logics Pretschner et al. 2008 . Previous work by Kumari and Pretschner (2013) showed how OSL policies can be translated into Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules for enforcement purposes. Hence we focus on the latter. Their semantics are as follows: If a system event e ∈ S refining the trigger Event is observed at timestep i and if the execution of this event would make the Condition true, then additional Actions might be performed at timestep i + 1. These include allowance, delaying, and inhibition of event e , as well as execution of additional events. ECA conditions Φare specified in terms of past linear temporal logics. Lichtenstein et al. (1985) . Their syntax is
For brevity, we omit the description of the formal semantics that are provided in and Kelbert and Pretschner (2014) . Intuitively, they are as follows. Ψ refers to constants true, false, and events E. An event operator e ∈ E evaluates to true iff, given the current dataflow state, an event refining e happens in the current timestep (see ref Σ (d, m, C) is true iff data d are contained in at most m containers in C. Given a state σ ∈ Σ, operators Ωthus constrain which data items D must or must not be contained in particular containers C, i.e., they constrain the set of "allowed" states σ . Φ defines propositional, temporal, and cardinality operators. The semantics of not, and, and or are intuitive; α since β is true iff β was true some time earlier and α was true ever since, or if α was always true; α before j is true iff α was true exactly j timesteps ago; repmin (j, m, e) is true iff event e happened at least m times in the last j timesteps. Further, repmax (j, m, e) ≡ not (repmin(j, m + 1, e)), and always(α ) ≡ α since false. Operator evalExt allows to incorporate external specification and evaluation logics, e.g., to specify conditions that refer to subject and object attributes or environmental conditions, such as (absolute) time and location. We leave the semantics of evalExt and its parameters Γ (including operations op) unspecified. Earlier implementations leveraged XPath for such purposes (Feth and Pretschner 2012; Wüchner and Pretschner 2012) .
For trace t ∈ T, timestep i ∈ N, and condition φ ∈ Φ, notation (t, i) |= φ denotes that trace t satisfies φ at time i. (30, 0, (sendOffer, {(obj, d) 
). Rule 1b inhibits sending of a contract offer involving data d if there was no corresponding contract request in the last 30 days (repmax (30, 0, (requestOffer, {(obj, d)}))) or if a contract offer was already sent (repmin(30, 1, (sendOffer, {(obj, d)}))). Rule 2 inhibits any usage of customer data d that were part of a declined contract offer at some earlier point in time (not (always(not ((declineOffer, {(obj, d)}))))). Rule 3 inhibits sending of contract d if it was not reviewed (repmax (30, 1, (review, {(obj, d)}))) or approved (repmax (30, 1, (approve, {(obj, d)}))) more than once. Rule 4 inhibits events that lead to a state in which customer data d are in more than one of the clerks workstations.
The above policies constitute templates: To protect a certain data item, the corresponding policies must be instantiated and deployed for this particular data item.
Enforcement Infrastructure
To enforce the above concepts, technical infrastructures (i) monitor system events S; (ii) track the flow of data on the basis of S F , R, and Σ; (iii) decide whether data usage system events S U ought to be allowed, modified, inhibited, delayed, or whether compensating actions need to be taken; and (iv) enforce the decisions Kumari et al. 2011; Neisse et al. 2011b; .
Architecture Overview.
All of the cited infrastructures are implemented along the following lines: Initially, the Policy Management Point (PMP) deploys the ECA rules to be enforced at the Policy Decision Point (PDP). System-layer specific Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs) intercept system events S, temporarily block them from execution, and signal them to the PDP. The PDP first forwards these events to the Policy Information Point (PIP), which maintains the system's dataflow state σ ∈ Σ in correspondence with the signaled dataflow system events. The PDP then evaluates the signaled event against all deployed ECA rules, possibly involving the PIP's state.
12:8 F. Kelbert and A. Pretschner Finally, the decision is sent back to the PEP, which enforces it and continues execution of the original event. Because PEPs are stateless, every such event must be evaluated by the PDP.
Policy Decision
Point. The PDP must ensure compliance with any deployed ECA rules. The PDP thus continuously evaluates them, considering conditions φ p ∈ Φ as expression trees as depicted in Figure 1 : Leaves represent constants true and false, events E, state-based operators Ω, and evalExt. Internal nodes represent operators such as not, and, before, since, and repmin. The tree's nodes are stateful, storing whether the operator's state changed during the current or previous timesteps. Now, consider an ECA rule with condition φ p ∈ Φ to be deployed at the PDP and that some PEP signals a system event e ∈ S. The PDP first forwards e to the PIP, which updates the dataflow state as detailed in Section 2.2.3. The subsequent policy evaluation thus grounds on an up-to-date dataflow state.
If e is a data usage event, e ∈ S U , then the PDP first updates the states of all leaf nodes of the expression tree representing φ p . The states of operators true and false are invariant. For a leaf representing event e ∈ E, the leaf's state is a counter indicating how many events refining e happened within the current timestep. This counter is incremented if (e, σ ) ref Σ e , where σ ∈ Σ denotes the current dataflow state. For leaf nodes representing state-based operators Ω, this update process is delegated to the PIP. For nodes of type evalExt, the update process is delegated to the corresponding external framework. In sum, the tree's leaves track how often events happened and whether state-based operators or operators of type evalExt changed their state.
After updating the leaf nodes, evaluation of the entire condition φ p may be triggered for two reasons: (1) If the signaled event e refines the trigger event e p , i.e., (e, σ ) ref Σ e p , then it must be evaluated whether e complies with the policy, and (2) if a timestep has passed, then it must be evaluated whether all temporal constraints are satisfied. In both cases, the expression tree of φ p is evaluated recursively from the root. We denote the evaluation result by eval(φ p ). It reflects (t, i) |= φ p with t ∈ T being the executing trace and i ∈ N the current point in time. If eval(φ p ) = true, then p's actions a p are applied. Otherwise, the signaled event e is allowed.
Recursive evaluation of operators not, and, and or is trivial: The corresponding nodes are stateless and their result is computed by combining the results of their child nodes. We explain the evaluation of selected complex operators in the following.
For e ∈ E, eval(e ) returns true if at least one event refining e happened within the current timestep. The state is reset if evaluation takes place at the end of a timestep.
For φ = α before j, an array stores the evaluation results of α of the last j timesteps. The result of eval(φ ) corresponds to the value that was stored j timesteps ago. When evaluating at the end of a timestep, the result of eval(α ) overwrites the oldest entry.
For φ = repmin (j, m, e ) , an array stores the number of refinements of e for the last j timesteps. eval(φ ) returns true if the sum of those values is greater than or equal to m. Note: If the PEP signaled an intended event, then the changes made to φ p 's expression tree's nodes' states, as well as all changes made to the PIP's dataflow state are rolled back after the above evaluation of φ p . This is because the PDP and PIP simulate how the allowance of the intended event would change their states. However, since the event was not actual, any such changes have not happened in the real system.
Policy Information
Point. The PIP maintains the system's dataflow state and evaluates state-based operators. Whenever the PDP signals a system event e ∈ S, the PIP evaluates whether there exists a corresponding state transition, i.e., whether ∃σ , σ ∈ Σ, e ∈ S F : (σ , e , σ ) ∈ R ∧ (e, σ ) ref Σ e . If so, then the dataflow state is updated according to the semantics defined by (σ , e , σ ) ∈ R.
To evaluate event refinement ref Σ , the PDP can query the PIP for all data contained in a specific container c, i.e., σ .s(c ). Using this result set, the PDP is able to evaluate whether d ∈ σ .s(c ) for any d ∈ D, and, consequently, whether
The PDP delegates evaluation of state-based operators Ω to the PIP. The PIP evaluates those on the basis of their semantics (see Section 2.1.3) and the current dataflow state using simple set operations. The PDP uses the result to update the state-based operator's state within the expression tree of the condition being evaluated.
DISTRIBUTED DATA USAGE CONTROL
The model and infrastructure from Section 2 are monolithic, as they refer to one single trace and system state: One single PDP/PIP regulates the execution of all system events. This necessitates communication with the central PDP /PIP for every observed system event. However, such a centralized approach is expected to be impractical for distributed system setups (Basin et al. 2015; Janicke et al. 2008) : Vital central components might not be able to scale and communication delays might significantly impact performance.
Example. We revisit policy 2 from the insurance company example. Assume that the company set up a centralized PDP and that the customer's data are used and stored on multiple systems, e.g., the web, email, and data analysis server. Since those systems' PEPs are stateless, they signal every event to the PDP-even if (i) the event does not operate on any customer data and if (ii) the policy does not apply for other reasons, e.g., because the customer has not declined the offer. If, instead, local PDPs could decide whether events comply with the policy, then no communication would be required.
This section presents a model that deploys local PDPs close to PEPs. The local PDPs retain enough information to take many decisions independently and conclusively, thus avoiding communication with a central PDP. We hypothesize that taking policy decisions locally decreases the overall communication and performance overheads-even though synchronization between the distributed PDPs becomes necessary.
We formalize a distributed system model (Section 3.1), on the basis of which we track dataflows across systems (Section 3.2, RQ1) and decentrally enforce global policies (Section 3.3, RQ2).
Distributed System Model
We extend the model from Section 2.1 by modeling different systems, their individual behaviors, and their interplay. We refer to the monolithic system from Section 2 as the distributed system, in which multiple PDPs/PIPs observe disjoint parts. We formalize how these individual decentral observations reassemble the observations of one single central PDP/PIP. This allows us to use the policy language from Section 2.1.3 within a distributed environment.
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For any system y ∈ Y, S y ⊆ S denotes its unique set of system events, C y ⊆ C its unique set of containers, I y ⊆ I its unique set of identifiers, T y ⊆ T its set of all possible system runs, and Σ y ⊆ Σ its set of all possible dataflow states:
Each system event e ∈ S y is required to carry parameter sys ∈ N with value y ∈ Y. State transitions R, specifying how dataflows between systems, are defined in Section 3.2.2.
In practice, individual systems run in parallel and produce independent system traces and dataflow states: The PDP of system y ∈ Y (PDP y ) observes trace t y ∈ T y , while the corresponding PIP (PIP y ) observes dataflow states σ t y ∈ Σ y . It is the union of these local observations that one single global PDP /PIP (PDP Y /PIP Y ) would observe. 
Sets of

Relating Individual Systems with Sets of Systems.
Running systems in parallel produces independent system traces and dataflow states (Section 3.1.1). Because the policy language (Section 2.1.3) only considers one single system trace and dataflow state, we formalize how multiple decentralized system runs and dataflow states correlate with the observations of a single central PDP/PIP.
Let denote the Cartesian product. Then τ ∈ y ∈Y T y is a tuple of traces of all systems; t τ y ∈ T y refers to the trace of system y ∈ Y. We define t τ Y ∈ T Y as the combined trace of systems Y ⊆ Y. For each timestep i ∈ N, the set of system events observed in Y corresponds to the union of the system events observed in all single systems y ∈ Y . This corresponds to what a central PDP would observe; see Figure 2 for an example: individual systems' storage, alias, and naming functions:
In summary, t τ Y and σ t τ Y reflect the trace and state of a set of systems Y , respectively. This allows to reason about the behavior of individual systems, sets of systems, their interrelations, and the distributed system as a whole. Our models for cross-system dataflow tracking (Section 3.2) and decentralized policy enforcement (Section 3.3) rely on these definitions.
Cross-System Dataflow Tracking
To protect all sensitive data copies across all systems, the enforcement infrastructure must know all data representations at all times. With the model from Section 3.1, each system y ∈ Y records its internal trace t y ∈ T y and associated dataflow states σ t y ∈ Σ y , recording which data resides in which containers at which point in time. Earlier work used this model to track data within Unix systems ) and Microsoft Windows (Wüchner and Pretschner 2012 ), e.g., by following the flow of data from a file into a process and back to another file. In a distributed system, the infrastructure must further be aware of all data copies across systems.
Example. In our example, policy 2 inhibits the execution of any events that use data that are associated with, or were derived from, a declined contract offer. Consider such a declined contract offer d that was archived in a database. Clerks requesting copies of (parts of) the declined contract offer do not violate the policy. To keep the clerks from using these copies of data d and thus violating the policy, all such (partial) copies of d must be tracked across all of the insurance company's systems at all times.
We instantiate the dataflow tracking model (Section 2.1.2) for distributed systems. Cross-system dataflows are recorded within the involved systems' dataflow states. Our approach is independent of the communication protocol and transparent to applications and the operating system. This allows to track data for a multitude of applications and protocols. For example, in the insurance company example, data are exchanged using applications and protocols such as email, web, and possibly proprietary protocols.
Our model integrates with aforementioned works that track data within single systems. We detail some aspects of intra-system tracking to outline the models' integration.
Addresses. Communication methods such as the Internet Protocol (IP) use addresses to identify network participants. Multiple addresses may be assigned to each system, reflecting that a system may in itself be distributed (see Section 3.1.1). We assume addresses A to be globally unique: No address may be assigned to more than one system over time. The integration of localhost addresses, NAT and DHCP is explained in Kelbert and Pretschner (2013) . Each system y ∈ Y is defined by its set of unique addresses:
Model Instantiation.
To be transparent to applications, we track dataflows in correspondence with system calls e ∈ S. Because these might be intercepted before or after execution by the kernel, they might be intended (e ∈ S I ) or actual (e ∈ S A ). Of interest are system calls whose semantics are such that they influence the dataflow state. Transition relation R reflects these semantics and has been defined for system-internal system calls in . For example, system calls creat, pipe, and fork create new containers (files, pipes, and processes) and assign corresponding identifiers (filenames, file descriptors, process ids), thus modifying naming function σ .n. Others (e.g., open, dup) create new identifiers (file descriptors) for existing containers. System calls such as read and write migrate data between containers, thereby modifying storage function σ .s. For example, if a process reads from a file, then σ .s is updated such that all data within the file is also considered to be within the reading process' memory.
For the dataflow state σ to correctly reflect (more precisely: overapproximate) the distribution of data within the system, transition relation R must correctly (and possibly conservatively) define for every system call how it changes mapping σ .s, σ .a, and σ .n. Section 3.2.2 provides corresponding definitions for networking-related system calls; these are based on system calls' manpage descriptions and observable behaviours.
We base cross-system dataflow tracking on the fact that processes (i) send data to the network by writing data from their process memory to a socket (system call sendto or equivalent) and (ii) receive data from the network by reading from a socket into their process memory (recvfrom or equivalent). Thus, two sets of containers are of particular interest: process memory C Proc ⊆ C and sockets C Sock ⊆ C.
We identify process memory C Proc by a system-relative process id I Pid , i.e., (I Sys × I Pid ) ⊆ I, with Y = I Sys . Sockets C Sock are identified via process-relative file descriptors I Fdsc , (I Sys × I Pid × I Fdsc ) ⊆ I, as well as via addresses A = I Addr and ports I Port , i.e., by the address (A = I Addr ) and port (I Port ) of the sender and the receiver (local socket name and remote socket name, respectively):
To formalize how data propagate between processes via sockets, we need additional notation: For sets S,T , mappings m, m :
Data Propagation.
Processes propagate data across systems in three steps: (1) socket creation, (2) sending of data to a socket, and (3) receiving of data from a socket. Assume that process p ∈ I Pid on system y p ∈ I Sys has read sensitive data d ∈ D into its process memory c p ∈ C Proc . System-internal dataflow tracking reflects this as follows: c p = σ .n((y p , p)) and d ∈ σ .s(c p ) ). Once process p writes to a network socket, the data written might include data d. Our model conservatively assumes that a process always writes all sensitive data associated with its memory.
(1) Socket creation. Each communication partner first creates a socket using system call socket. The returned file descriptor enables the calling process to write to and read from the socket. With c l ∈ C representing the newly created socket, fd ∈ I Fdsc its file descriptor, and p the calling process on host y p , transition relation R models this behaviour by updating the dataflow state with mapping c l = σ .n((y p , p, fd)). Formally:
The socket can only be used for communication after it has been assigned a (local) socket name, i.e., a IP address and port (a l , o l ) ∈ (I Addr × I Port ) ⊆ I. Depending on the communication protocol, this assignment may be implicit (on first communication) or explicit (using system call bind). The assigned socket name can later be obtained from the operating system or from the parameters of system calls sendto and recvfrom.
(2) Sending data. Consider a process p A ∈ I Pid on host y p A ∈ I Sys that calls sendto on file descriptor fd A ∈ I Fdsc identifying socket c A = σ .n((y p A , p A , fd A )). This leads to a dataflow from the process memory of process p A to socket c A . With σ representing the old dataflow state and σ the updated dataflow state, transition relation R models this dataflow by updating the storage function of c A to contain all previous data plus all data associated with process
representing the local socket name of c A and (a B , o B ) the name of the remote socket to which p A sends data, R further creates a new identifier for c A , c A = σ .n( ((a A , o A ), (a B , o B ) )). Formally, (σ , (sendto, < params >), σ ) ∈ R is defined as:
(3) Receiving data. Process p B on host y p B then receives data from socket c B ∈ C Sock by issuing system call recvfrom on file descriptor fd B ∈ I Fdsc . Consequently, all data sent by the remote process are propagated into the process memory of p B . Transition relation R reflects this dataflow by updating the storage function of the process memory of p B to contain all previous data plus all data contained in the remote socket identified by
In combination with intra-system dataflow tracking, these definitions track dataflows within and across systems. They ensure soundness by overapproximating dataflows. While overapproximations might lead to policies being enforced for containers that in reality do not contain sensitive data, they are required because system calls cannot capture process internal dataflows. Higher precision can be achieved by application internal dataflow tracking. In practice, overapproximations are limited for two reasons: (i) Sockets are identified by the local and remote socket name. Data written to a socket thus only affects the communicating processes. (ii) Server applications often fork worker processes to process requests. The parent process remains untainted and keeps forking untainted workers. We discuss and evaluate overapproximations in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2.2.
We defer cross-system policy propagation and further implementation details to Section 4.2. With the above models, policy propagation boils down to attaching the corresponding policy whenever a cross-system dataflow is detected. Section 5.2 provides evaluation results.
Coordinating Policy Decisions across Systems
After protected data are distributed to multiple sytems, the corresponding policies must be consistently enforced. We envision PDPs to be decentrally deployed, thus overcoming the drawbacks of a centralized infrastructure by taking policy decisions locally, efficiently, conclusively, and consistently.
Example. Consider again policy 2 from our example and a situation in which (i) the customer has declined the corresponding contract offer and (ii) multiple clerks have local copies of associated, possibly derived, data d. Using a centralized enforcement infrastructure, all data usage events on any data from all clerks must always be evaluated by the central PDP /PIP. This is because local PEPs lack any logic and knowledge to decide whether a particular event handles protected data. If PDPs and PIPs were decentralized, then events not involving data d can always be allowed locally. Events that do involve d only necessitate coordination with other PDPs if the contract offer was never declined; otherwise, local PDPs can instantly deny any such events.
Enforcing global policies in a decentralized manner introduces the necessity for coordination: Each PDP's decisions might depend on past decisions and observations of other PDPs. While each PDP could reveal all its information to all other PDPs, such a solution imposes significant runtime and communication overheads. We limit the coordination effort by identifying a minimal and complete set of systems necessary to evaluate a given policy. Section 3.3.1 provides a first (over-)approximation of the set of systems relevant for evaluating a given policy; Section 3.3.2 identifies situations in which coordination between such relevant systems can be safely omitted without compromising policy enforcement.
Identifying Relevant Systems.
This section identifies an overapproximation of the set of systems relevant for evaluating a given ECA rule p. We define auxiliary functions:
(1) knowC : P(C) → P(Y). Given a set of containers, knowC returns the set of systems in which one of those containers resides:
. Given a set of data items, a point in time, and a tuple of concurrently executing traces, knowD relies on the systems' dataflow states to return the set of systems in which there exists a container containing at least one of the data items:
knowD is parameterized in time because data keep being propagated across systems. (3) happens : E × N × T → P(Y). Given an event, a point in time, and a tuple of concurrently executing traces, happens returns the set of systems in which an event refining e happens:
Taken together, knowC, knowD, and happens allow to identify the set of systems that "know" a certain container or data, or in which a particular event happened. On this basis, we define function relevant : Φ × N × T → P(Y). For an ECA rule p, relevant identifies the set of systems that potentially contribute to the evaluation of p's condition φ p ∈ Φ at a given point in time i ∈ N and given a set of concurrently executing traces τ ∈ y ∈Y T y . The observation behind the definition of relevant is that solely atomic operators of φ p (E, combined, notIn, maxIn, repmin) determine which systems are relevant 2 :
The rationale is as follows: Trivial formulas of φ = true and φ = false can always be evaluated locally. For φ = e, relevant systems are those in which an event refining e happens at the current timestep. For operators notIn(d, C) and maxIn(d, m, C) , relevant systems know data d and some c ∈ C. For combined (d 1 , d 2 , C), relevant systems are those that know d 1 , d 2 , and some c ∈ C. For repmin (j, m, e) , relevant systems are those in which an event refining e has happened in the last j timesteps. For not, and, or, since, and before, relevant systems are determined recursively.
Our goal was to identify a minimal and complete set of systems necessary to evaluate a given policy. The following theorem states that relevant (φ, i, τ ) is complete. Intuitively, systems Y \ relevant (φ, i, τ ) do not change the policy evaluation result. The proof is provided in Kelbert and Pretschner (2014) : . In summary, if |relevant (φ, i, τ )| ≤ 1, then decisions can be taken locally. Otherwise, PDPs and PIPs must reveal all event occurrences and state changes to all systems relevant (φ, i, τ ). This already improves over revealing all information to all systems Y. Section 3.3.2 further identifies situations in which communication with even fewer systems is needed, thus working towards a minimal set of systems.
Omitting Unnecessary Communication.
Given a set of systems Y relevant (φ, i, τ ), it is generally not possible to conclusively evaluate formula φ ∈ Φ at time i ∈ N: the evaluation of φ might depend on information unavailable within Y . However, in certain situations, φ can be evaluated even if some information is unavailable. We identify such situations to further reduce the required communication.
Given τ ∈ y ∈Y T y , there might exist a formula φ ∈ Φ such that Y satisfies φ , and this implies global satisfaction of φ. Formally:
Whether such Y and φ exist depends on the characteristics of φ. We first define formula projections, "hiding" parts of φ that are unknown within Y relevant (φ, i, τ ), i.e., parts that can only be evaluated by systems Y \ Y . We define the projection φ Y ∈ Φ of φ ∈ Φ as: repmin(j, m, e) ).
These projections allow to identify and formalize situations in which only a subset of relevant systems is sufficient to evaluate a given formula. Consequently, coordination is only required among a subset of all relevant systems, thus reducing communication.
This fact is captured by predicate Sat ⊆ T× P(Y) × N × Φ, which is shortly defined to hold true iff for τ ∈ y ∈Y T y and The definition of Sat is based on three observations: (i) some atomic operators (e.g., E, combined), are satifisfied globally if they are satisfied in at least one system; (ii) some atomic operators (e.g., notIn, maxIn) are violated globally if they are violated in only one system; (iii) the global satisfaction of compound operators (e.g., and, since) depends on their semantics as well as the local satisfaction of the nested operators.
To define Sat, we demand φ ∈ Φ to be given in disjunctive normal form (DNF). The reason is that for atomic operators the results of Sat should be different depending on whether they are "encapsulated" in an even or an odd number of negations. When φ is in DNF, then negations only occur next to atomic operators. The following definition only enumerates cases for which Sat = true; other cases yield Sat = false. Proofs of correctness of the above theorem are provided in Kelbert and Pretschner (2014) : Fig. 3 . Our architecture and its most important components and interfaces.
In summary, predicate Sat identifies situations in which no coordination between systems is required despite |relevant (φ, i, τ )| > 1. Section 4.3 details how our implementation leverages these results. Section 5.3 shows how the above considerations improve both performance and communication overheads when enforcing global data usage policies.
ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
In line with Section 3, we present an architecture and implementation that (i) tracks dataflows across systems and propagates the corresponding policies (Section 4.2), and (ii) preventively, efficiently, and consistently enforces global policies (Section 4.3).
High-Level Architecture
By definition (see Section 3.1.1), a system consists of multiple PEPs sharing the same PDP/PIP. The fact that these PEPs might be distributed makes our architecture (see Figure 3) highly flexible: our system might be deployed (i) on each physical system to implement a fully decentralized infrastructure, (ii) as a single central component, and (iii) in a hybrid fashion.
The architecture is composed of PEPs, a Controller, and a distributed database. The Controller features the PDP, PIP, and PMP, and coordinates their internal communication. We minimize changes to existing local enforcement infrastructures by introducing a Distribution Management Point (DMP). The DMP organizes cross-system dataflow tracking and policy propagation in a peer-to-peer manner (Section 4.2) and leverages a distributed database to coordinate distributed policy decisions (Section 4.3).
The CommunicationManager manages all external communication and runs servers that exhibit the components' functionalities to the outside. Most importantly, the PdpServer provides the interface for PEPs to request data usage control decisions. Additional servers allow to deploy PDP, PIP, and PMP remotely from one another, thus catering to complex deployment requirements. The DmpServer enables the communication with remote DMPs. We secure all communication using TLS and assume the integrity and mutual authentication of remote Controllers; this is discussed in Section 5.1.
The RequestHandler organizes the sequential and in-order processing of requests arriving at the servers, thus avoiding event reordering and race conditions. We implemented the above infrastructure in Java. To support its flexible deployment, the internal components can communicate both via function calls as well as via the provided servers. A straightforward strategy is to deploy one single central Controller, thus mimicking the behavior of a centralized infrastructure. However, our rationale is to deploy PDPs and PIPs locally, e.g., per machine or department. This way, PEPs query their local PDP and each PIP keeps a local dataflow state.
We further implemented a Linux PEP on the basis of strace (Kranenburg and Levin 2015) . The PEP intercepts system calls both before and after their execution by the kernel ), thus signaling both intended and actual system calls to the PDP. Note that our architecture supports existing PEPs, e.g., for Microsoft Windows (Wüchner and Pretschner 2012) and Android (Feth and Pretschner 2012) .
Several interfaces organize the communication between the components: The PDP provides interfaces IPmp2Pdp and IPep2Pdp, providing methods to deploy and retrieve policies, as well as to signal system events and await policy decisions.
At the PIP, the PDP uses interface IPdp2Pip to evaluate state-based operators, retrieve all data within a given container, and signal dataflow system events. The PMP uses interface IPmp2Pip to inform the PIP about initial data representations (see Section 4.2). Interface IDmp2Pip is used by the DMP in case cross-system dataflows occur.
The PMP provides interface IDmp2Pmp, which is used by the local DMP to deploy policies and to retrieve currently deployed policies.
The DMP provides four interfaces: (1) IPip2Dmp allows the PIP to inform the DMP about dataflows to remote socket containers. (2) IPdp2Dmp enables the coordination of policy decisions across PDPs. This includes methods to (i) notify that an operator's state has changed, (ii) query whether the state of some operator has changed at remote PDPs, and (iii) synchronize the points in time in which policies are evaluated. (3) IPmp2Dmp allows the PMP to register policies at the DMP. (4) IDmp2Dmp provides functionalities for cross-system dataflow tracking and policy propagation between remote DMPs.
In the following, we assume one fully functional Controller to be deployed per system. Section 4.2 describes how we achieve cross-system dataflow tracking and policy propagation, while Section 4.3 describes the coordination of distributed policy decisions.
Cross-System Dataflow Tracking and Policy Propagation
Socket communication involves two communication partners. We call these a client and a server process, albeit there is no technical difference once communication was initiated. Our approach applies transitively for larger numbers of processes. We focus on the case in which the client and the server process are remote in the sense that different PIPs are responsible for tracking the processes' dataflows. We describe a communication protocol independent implementation in line with Section 3.2.
Communication Initiation.
When the server process s (respectively, client process c) executes system call socket, the implementation creates a socket container c s ∈ C Sock (respectively, c c ∈ C Sock ) and an auxiliary proxy socket container c 
Data Transmission and Policy Propagation.
The two processes then exchange data by writing to and reading from the sockets. The DMPs track those dataflows and transfer the corresponding policies. We describe how the implementation reflects a data transfer from a client process p c on system C to a server process p s on system S.
First, PEP C intercepts the client process' intended sendto(o, y p c , p c , fd, (a c , o c ), (a s , o s )) (see Section 3.2.2) and signals it to PDP C . In case PDP C allows the event's execution, PIP C detects the intended cross-system dataflow. This is the case if the current state σ ∈ Σ is such that data D = σ .s(σ .n ((y p c , p c , fd)) ) are propagated to a container of type C Proxy , i.e., if ∃i ∈ ((I Addr × I Port ) × (I Addr × I Port )), c DMP C then retrieves from PMP C the set of policies P that constrain the usage of any data within set D. DMP C then contacts DMP S , conveying policies P and the fact that data D are about to flow into the container identified by i. DMP S informs PIP S about the incoming dataflow, which updates the storage function of the container identified by i with D. DMP S also informs PMP S about policies P and PMP S deploys them at PDP S .
After this call to DMP S succeeded, the actual sendto system call is executed and the payload dataflows. Once the server process p s invokes recvfrom on the socket, PDP S and PIP S are already aware of the dataflow and enforce policies P on the server's system. The PDPs' and PIPs' states should only evolve persistently in the presence of actual system events (Section 2.2.2). This, however, leads to race conditions if sendto and recvfrom interleave. We mitigate this problem by conservative modeling: whenever the PDP allows an intended sendto, both the PDPs' and PIPs' states immediately evolve persistently.
Taking Distributed Policy Decisions
Global policies must be enforced across all systems. Based on Section 3.3, we detail the practical evaluation of conditions Φ. We take the view of the PDP of system A, PDP A , which enforces ECA rule p with trigger event e p ∈ E, condition φ p ∈ Φ, and action a p .
Any (o ) ) and if eval(not (o )) = false. If any of those queries yields a result different from (eval(φ p )), then φ p is re-evaluated, considering this newly available information.
To obtain consistent decisions for time-based policies, the PDPs coordinate policy evaluation times via the DMPs. While such synchronization is subject to scheduling and clock synchronization issues, our implementation synchronizes clocks using NTP. We did not experience any evaluation inconsistencies.
Implementation Using Cassandra.
We synchronize decisions using the distributed database Cassandra. Here, the set of all nodes is called a cluster. The data are organized via keyspaces and each table is associated with exactly one keyspace. Each keyspace is configured with a replication strategy, defining among which nodes its tables are replicated. Hence, data with the same replication requirements are organized within the same keyspace. In our context, PDPs need to enforce several policies and for each the set of coordinating PDPs might differ. Hence, we represent each policy by one dynamically adjusting keyspace. For example, for policy p constraining the usage of data d with representations in systems A and B, we employ keyspace k p with replication strategy k r p = {A, B}. If PDP A notifies a state change of p to DMP A , then this information is made available within k p and replicated to DMP B .
We achieve strong data consistency by performing all queries with consistency level Quorum. Each query is thus acknowledged by at least half of the nodes. This avoids inconsistent states and race conditions when evaluating policies. Because queries might fail due to network partitions, it is configurable how often failed queries are retried. If queries keep failing, then the PDP takes a fallback decision as configured within the policy.
Bootstrapping and Cross-System Dataflows. Once the first policy p, protecting data d, is deployed at system A, PMP A (i) informs PIP A about the initial representation of d as configured within p, (ii) registers policy p at DMP A , which prepares keyspace k p with k r p = {A}, and (iii) deploys p at PDP A . For now, PDP A can independently evaluate p.
Once system A shares data d with system B (see Section 4.2), the latter might influence evaluation p. DMP B thus adapts keyspace k p to incorporate the Cassandra node of system B: k r p = {A, B}. Subsequently, all information in k p is replicated to both DMP A and DMP B . If data d are further shared with system C, DMP C adapts the keyspace to k r p = {A, B, C}, thus replicating all information in k p to nodes A, B, and C.
Connecting Nodes. In Cassandra, nodes join the cluster by contacting well-known seed nodes. Since our infrastructure ought to be fully decentralized, we proceed as follows.
Reconsider the scenario in which policy p, protecting data d, is deployed only at PDP A . Later, d, and hence p, is transferred to system B. Earlier we assumed that system B's Cassandra node already participated in the cluster. Otherwise, Cassandra node B must join the cluster without any well-known seed nodes. We do so by starting each Cassandra node only once the first global policy must be enforced: Once DMP B is informed about some cross-system dataflow from DMP A , it gets to know address a of system A's Cassandra node. Cassandra node B is then started, using a as a seed node.
Consider an extended scenario in which systems A and B enforce policy p, protecting data d, while system C enforces policy p protecting data d . Since the sets of systems enforcing p and p are disjoint, the overall cluster is partitioned. Once data d are transferred from system A to system C, we merge these partitions by starting a temporary Cassandra node, which uses both Cassandra nodes A and C as seed nodes. Once the previously autonomous parts merged, the temporary node is taken down again.
EVALUATION
We perform a security analysis of our infrastructure (Section 5.1) and evaluate which communication and performance overheads our solution introduces (Sections 5.3 and 5.2).
Security Analysis
Since our infrastructure enforces compliance with data usage policies, we primarily consider attacks trying to obtain unprotected data copies. We further consider attacks on the integrity and availability of our infrastructure and usage controlled data.
Possible Attacks and Countermeasures.
We assume that all aspects of our infrastructure were modeled and implemented correctly. To ensure soundness, we conservatively modeled dataflow tracking (Section 3.2) and the identification of relevant systems (Section 3.3).
Privilege Escalation. Attackers might leverage vulnerabilities in our infrastructure, the operating system, cryptographic libraries and access control mechanisms to escalate their privileges. If successful, they may tamper with the usage control infrastructure and disable policy enforcement or dataflow tracking. We consider the mitigation of such security vulnerabilities an orthogonal problem that we do not address in this work.
Copy Data at Rest. Attackers might try to create unprotected copies of usage controlled data that have been stored to disk or other storage media. Since our PEP mediates system calls, our infrastructure thwarts such attacks that originate from system layers above the operating system. In particular, usage control policies can keep users from saving protected data to removable storage media (Feth and Pretschner 2012) . Attacks can therefore only be performed at or below the operating system layer. Disk-encryption software can keep users and administrators from physically unmounting the harddisk and accessing the protected data on non-usagecontrolled systems. Encryption keys must then only be accessible to the usage control infrastructure, see Section 7. Usage control metadata, such as policies and configuration files, can be secured alike.
Share Data with Unmonitored Systems. Attackers might try to use application-layer protocols to share usage controlled data with systems that do not run a usage control infrastructure. Once our infrastructure detects such an intended cross-system dataflow, it contacts the remote system's infrastructure (see Section 4.2.2). Our prototype denies sharing of usage controlled data with non usage controlled systems by inhibiting cross-system dataflows if the remote infrastructure does not respond according to the protocol. Mechanisms such as remote attestation can further secure this procedure (Agreiter et al. 2007 ), see Section 7. Future solutions might also allow to release protected data after they were encrypted with a key that is only known to the usage control infrastructure.
Eavesdrop Data in Transit.
A man-in-the-middle might eavesdrop sensitive payload data if applications transfer usage controlled data via plaintext protocols such as HTTP. Such attacks can be prevented by (i) disallowing plaintext protocols for protected data, e.g., using firewalls or deep packet inspection, or by (ii) tunneling such traffic over secure protocols such as VPN or SSH. Both deep packet inspection and protocol tunneling may be implemented in a transparent manner as part of the usage control infrastructure. We protect any of our infrastructure's remote communication via the TLS protocol.
Infrastructure Integrity. Attackers may try to tamper with the infrastructure, e.g., by modifying its binaries. The infrastructure's integrity must therefore be protected by digital signatures and corresponding verification procedures. While such techniques are increasingly implemented in commodity systems, we consider this an orthogonal issue.
Data and System Availability. Attackers might taint large parts of the system with sensitive data by "leveraging" dataflow tracking overapproximations (Section 3.2) . If the data's policy disallows any data usage, then no further usage of any tainted parts of the system would be possible. However, such attacks are limited to resources for which the attacker has write permissions, since sensitive data can only be propagated to those data containers. To mitigate such attacks, dataflow tracking models must be refined to track data at a finer granularity. Corresponding solutions that track data within web browsers, databases, email clients and windowing systems have been proposed (Kumari et al. 2011; Lienert 2012; Lörscher 2012; .
Denial of Service attacks may be mounted by issuing massive amounts of system events, leading to system overload and to (temporary) unavailability of usage controlled data. Mutual authentication between all infrastructure components, e.g., using certificates or remote attestation, may thwart such attacks and introduce liabilities. Sophisticated distributed denial of service attacks are hard to counteract to date.
Side Channels and Media Breaks are out of scope of this work. Once data are printed or displayed, we can no longer guarantee its protection. Corresponding protection mechanisms are being researched, e.g., Echizen et al. (2015) .
Provided Guarantees.
In the light of the above attacks and countermeasures, our usage control infrastructure provides the following security guarantees.
End Users. In a number of scenarios end users do not have administrative privileges on the devices on which they store and process sensitive data. This includes employees of companies, governments, and other organizations, as well as most end users of today's integrated and embedded devices, mobile phones, and tablet computers. In any of these scenarios our solution prevents both intentional and accidental policy violations. Software and malware running on behalf of the end user falls into the same category.
For example, clerks might try to use and/or share "quarantined" customer records (Section 1, policy 2), send out contract offers before they were approved (policy 3), or create additional copies of customer records (policy 4). By implementing the PEP at the system call layer, any such policy violation attempts can be detected independent of the applications being used. Through the use of both system-internal and cross-system dataflow tracking, the end user is not able to obfuscate such attacks, e.g., by first creating local or remote copies or derivations of the protected data: Any such data copies/derivations are detected, tracked, and protected just as the original data.
Administrators. If end users do have administrative privileges, our infrastructure reliably prevents illegitimate data usage as long as the user does not deliberately turn off the usage control infrastructure. For example, our infrastructure can prevent the user, misconfigured applications, or malware from misusing protected data or from releasing sensitive personal data on the Internet.
To defend against intentional attacks from users with administrative privileges, our infrastructure necessitates integration with protection mechanisms below the operating system layer. We discuss such technologies on the basis of trusted hardware in Section 7.
Summary. Our infrastructure prevents illegitimate data misuse and leakage as long as it is not deliberately disabled by administrators. We argue that these guarantees are sufficient in many scenarios: Large parts of the world's sensitive data are collected, processed and stored in environments in which end users are unable to disable security solutions that operate with administrative privileges at the operating system layer.
Cross-System Dataflow Tracking and Policy Propagation
In Section 5.2.1, we evaluate the performance of cross-system dataflow tracking and policy propagation. Section 5.2.2 analyzes the precision of our dataflow tracking system.
Performance.
We evaluate the performance of cross-system dataflow tracking and policy propagation by measuring (i) the maximum HTTPS request throughput of the Apache web server, (ii) the maximum network throughput of Iperf, and (iii) FTPS file transfer times of the Vsftpd FTP server. We evaluate both the preventive and detective policy enforcement mode of our infrastructure. Detective enforcement provides better performance, since the PEP can continue execution once an event was signaled to the Controller. Instead, for preventive enforcement the PEP must block on all events and wait for a decision by the PDP. We also evaluate which parts of our infrastructure cause which overheads, thus separating (i) event processing and signaling by the PEP and (ii) dataflow tracking and policy propagation by the Controller.
Setup. We connected several machines via a 10Gbit network, each featuring a 2x2.6GHz CPU and 4GB RAM. Each machine ran Ubuntu 14.04 and a Controller. One machine hosted the server application (Apache, Iperf, Vsftpd) that was monitored by the PEP. The PEP signaled both intended and actual system calls to the local Controller. The clients ran benchmarks against the server, with their Controller s answering all of server's Controller's requests as described in Section 4.2. In particular, this includes the remote communication for cross-system dataflow tracking and policy propagation.
Apache HTTPS. We used the ApacheBench benchmark to request files of size 1KB and 1MB from Apache. We performed all experiments with both persistent and non-persistent connections. For all experiments we were limited by the server's CPU.
1KB Files. Using non-persistent connections, Apache serves 1KB files at a native baseline comparison rate of 543req/s (Figure 4(a), ) . Signaling events from the PEP to the Controller imposes a performance penalty for both preventive and detective policy enforcement. This is because of the expensive JNI communication between the PEP and the Controller. Signaling of events to the Controller, i.e., without further processing and dataflow tracking, degrades performance to 239req/s (44.0% of native throughput) and 257req/s (47.3%) for preventive and detective enforcement, respectively (Figure 4(a), , ) . With dataflow tracking and policy propagation, the respective resulting throughputs are 153req/s (28.2%) and 218req/s (40.1%) (Figure 4(a), , ) .
With persistent connections, native Apache achieves 2823req/s (Figure 4(b), ) . Event signaling for preventive and detective enforcement results in throughputs of 1556req/s (55.1%) and 2034req/s (72.0%), respectively (Figure 4(b), , ) . With dataflow tracking and policy propagation, the respective resulting throughputs are 595req/s (21.1%) and 1188req/s (42.1%) (Figure 4(b), , ) .
1MB Files. For larger files of 1MB, persistent connections did not improve performance. We thus combine the results of persistent and non-persistent connections. Native Apache achieves 66.3req/s (Figure 4(c), ) . Event signaling for preventive and detective enforcement results in throughputs of 44.4req/s (66.8%) and 48.2req/s (72.7%), respectively (Figure 4(c), , ) . With dataflow tracking and policy propagation, the respective resulting throughputs are 27.5req/s (41.4%) and 44.7req/s (67.3%) (Figure 4(c), , ) . In sum, our infrastructure achieves 21-41% throughput of native Apache when operating in preventive enforcement mode and 40-44% when in detective mode.
Iperf Bandwidth. We use Iperf, a network throughput benchmark, to further measure the impact of our infrastructure on network throughput. Native Iperf achieves a throughput of 9.1Gbps ( Figure 5, ) . Event signaling for preventive and detective enforcement results in throughputs of 5.2Gbps (56.9% of native throughput) and 6.7Gbps (73.4%), respectively (Figure 5, , ) . With dataflow tracking and policy propagation, we achieve throughputs of 3.3Gbps (36.6%) and 5.0Gbps (54.7%) (Figure 4(a), , ) .
Vsftpd FTPS. We evaluate the impact of our infrastructure on FTPS file transfer times by measuring download/upload times for 1KB and 16MB files from/to the Vsftpd server.
1KB Files. Since download and upload times for 1KB files are similar (see Figure 6 (a) and (b), we only detail results for file downloads. Native Vsftpd achieves a baseline transfer time of 240ms (Figure 6(a), ) . Event signaling for preventive and detective enforcement results in file download times of 328ms (36.7% increased download time) and 300ms (25.0%), respectively (Figure 6(a), , ). With dataflow tracking and policy propagation, download times are 437ms (82.1%) and 331ms (38.1%) (Figure 6(a), , ) .
16MB Files. Native Vsftpd serves 16MB files in 513ms (Figure 6(c), ) . Event signaling for preventive and detective enforcement results in download times of 835ms (62.9%) and 621ms (21.2%), respectively ( Figure 6(c), , ) . With dataflow tracking and policy propagation, download times are 1,405ms (174%) and 729ms (42.1%) (Figure 6(c), , ) .
For 16MB files, native Vsftpd achieves upload times of 595ms (Figure 6(d), ) . The overhead imposed by our infrastructure is higher than for file downloads: Event signaling for preventive and detective enforcement results in upload times of 1,642ms (176%) and 1,147ms (92.9%), respectively ( Figure 6(d), , ) . With dataflow tracking and policy propagation, upload times are 3,252ms (446%) and 1,304ms (119%) (Figure 6(d), , ) . The higher overhead results from Vsftpd issuing approximately 3× more system calls when compared to file downloads. Since our infrastructure intercepts and analyses all of these system calls, this results in longer file transfer times.
Summary. On the basis of the above experiments, our overall infrastructure operates at a network throughput between 21% and 41% of native execution when performing cross-system dataflow tracking and policy propagation in a preventive manner. We achieve a throughput of 40-54% of native execution when operating in detective enforcement mode. File transfer times for FTPS increase by 82-446% when in preventive mode and by 38-119% for detective enforcement.
The evaluation shows that signaling of events from the PEP to the Controller amounts for large parts of the overhead. This is due to the JNI communication between the PEP, which is necessarily written in C, and the Controller, which was written in Java due to its complexity. The evaluation of Vsftpd shows that our infrastructure imposes less overhead if the monitored application issues fewer system calls. For I/O intensive applications, this overhead can be reduced by increasing the application's I/O buffer sizes, thereby decreasing the amount of required system calls. Overall, it depends on use case scenarios whether the imposed overheads are acceptable in practice.
Precision.
We analyze the precision of dataflow tracking by serving static and dynamic resources via an Apache web server. We use the Apache mpm_prefork module, which allows for the flexible configuration of Apache worker processes. With this module, Apache pre-forks a given amount of worker processes, each of which sequentially handles incoming requests. For the experiment, we attach individual policies to the resources and observe how they propagate to the clients.
Static Resources. The first client requesting any static resource is served with exactly the policy that was attached to the requested resource. Further clients suffer from overapproximations: They are not only served the policy of the requested resource, but also a subset of the policies that were served to other clients before. The reason is that each worker process accumulates all policies of all resources that it has ever served. To ensure soundness, all of these policies are then always propagated to all clients.
There exist two immediate and simple means to remedy these overapproximations: (i) Configure Apache to kill each worker process after it served one connection (via the MaxConnectionsPerChild 1 directive). This, however, significantly impacts performance; (ii) Enrich the dataflow propagation semantics of the shutdown system call (which shuts down socket connections, see Kelbert and Pretschner (2013) ) with minimal application specific semantics: If the process p calling shutdown on a socket is Apache, then clear the process' storage function, i.e., set σ .s((y p , p)) = ∅. As a consequence, the following request will only be associated with policies of resources that are accessed from then on.
Dynamic Resources. We further set up an Apache/MySQL/PHP-based Drupal content management system to serve dynamic web pages. Serving such dynamic resources, we observe dataflow tracking overapproximations beyond those of static resources. The reason is a combination of the following: (i) We associate policies with fine-grained Drupal data items such as articles or contact form submissions; (ii) Drupal stores this content within the MySQL database; (iii) MySQL stores all content of a database within a file; (iv) the system call PEP operates at a granularity of files. Consequently, whenever Drupal serves content from one particular MySQL database, the requesting client receives all policies associated with any data stored within that database.
While these overapproximations are an essential limitation of tracking data flows at the system call layer, specialized solutions compatible with our infrastructure have been proposed: Lienert (2012) formalizes and implements dataflow tracking for MySQL at a granularity of single cells; Lovat et al. (2016) provide a more generic approach to track dataflows across different system layers. Using information provided by such application-specific dataflow tracking solutions, it is possible to improve the granularity of cross-system dataflow tracking in the presence of complex software such as Drupal.
Distributed Policy Decisions
We evaluate the communication and performance overheads when decentrally enforcing global policies. For this, we enforce several policies on multiple systems simultaneously and compare the results with a centralized infrastructure.
Setup. We use 11 systems as detailed in Section 5.2 and a 12th system with 16GB RAM. For the centralized setup, the latter hosts the one and only Controller. For the decentralized setup, each of the 11 former systems is equipped with one Controller.
The following parameters influenced the results: (i) the policy (policies 1, 2, and 3 from Section 2.1.3); (ii) the number of usage controlled systems (3 ≤ t ≤ 11); (iii) the number of systems enforcing the policy (e ≤ t); (iv) the global event frequency in events per second (f ≤ 167Ev/s); (v) the percentage of events relevant for dataflow tracking and/or policy evaluation (0% ≤ r ≤ 100%) For each measurement, we fixed all parameters and randomly generated event traces that matched f and r . Each event was randomly assigned to one of the t usage controlled systems and the policy was evaluated at every trigger event as well as for a timestep interval of one second. In the centralized case, all t systems must signal every event to the central Controller to take policy decisions (see Section 3). In the decentral case, the e policy-enforcing systems evaluate the policy locally and coordinate those decisions with all other e − 1 policy-enforcing systems. The remaining t − e systems do not evaluate any policy and do thus not exchange any information.
For the performance evaluation it was of importance whether the policy was evaluated on actual or intended events. To obtain worst case results, we triggered the (expensive) distributed policy evaluation on actual events. We obtain best case results by not triggering any policy evaluation on intended events.
Different values for r reveal the effect of the optimizations proposed in Section 3.3. Without these, the results for our decentralized approach would coincide with r = 100%.
We detail results for enforcing ECA rule 3 within eleven usage controlled systems (t = 11). Out of those, five or eleven systems enforce the policy (e 1 = 5, e 2 = 11). Results for other policies and amounts of systems are described in Kelbert (2016) . While absolute numbers differ, the general trends are similar to what we describe here.
Communication Overhead.
For the central system setup, each event caused 1170Bytes to be exchanged between the PEP and the central Controller. The communication overhead is thus linear in the event frequency (Figure 7, ). The percentage of relevant events r and the number of policy-enforcing systems e did not influence the results: as the PEPs are stateless, they must signal every event to the central PDP/PIP. Figure 7 (a) and (b) show the communication overhead if five and eleven systems enforce the policy, respectively. First, Cassandra causes some base "noise" to keep the database in a consistent state. Hence, the centralized approach performs inexorably better for very low event frequencies. The decentralized approach performs better the lower the percentage of relevant events: For low percentages of relevant events ( (r = 10%), (25%)), policies can often be conclusively evaluated locally, and few state changes must be coordinated. Traces with many relevant events ( (75%), systems enforce the policy, then (i) events and state changes must only be coordinated between five systems; (ii) any events issued by the six remaining systems will never trigger any coordination. In sum, the lower the fraction of systems enforcing the policy, the less state changes must be coordinated across fewer systems. For policy 3 and t = 11, the decentralized approach performs better than the centralized approach if e = 5 ∧ f ≥ 30Ev/s, or e 2 = 11 ∧ r ≤ 10% ∧ f ≥ 70Ev/s, or e 2 = 11 ∧ r ≤ 25% ∧ f ≥ 140Ev/s. Figure 8 shows the performance overhead for signaling events from the PEP to the Controller and their evaluation by the PDP/PIP. Figure 8(a) shows the results for actual system events, while Figure 8 (b) shows those for intended system events. Since our policies were configured to be evaluated only for actual events, Figure 8 Figure 8(a) shows that the performance of the distributed approach is bad when evaluating actual events within active systems (i.e., systems that actually enforce the policy) in combination with a low event frequency (f 50Ev/s) and many relevant events (50% ( ), 75% ( ), 100% ( )). In this case, many state changes must be written to the database, resulting in wait times for the acknowledgements of remote nodes. Some of this overhead is due to code warm up, as the code of both Cassandra and our infrastructure must be warmed up on 11 systems. For higher event frequencies (f > 80Ev/s), the reliance on Cassandra is advantageous. The decentralized approach is benevolent towards inactive systems that do not enforce the policy: no remote communication is ever required for those systems and hence performance overheads are low.
Performance Overhead.
Figure 8(b) shows that for intended events the decentralized approach outperforms the centralized approach in all situations. In this case no policy evaluation was ever performed, making deployment of a decentralized approach particularly beneficial.
Summary. Communication and performance overheads of our decentralized infrastructure depend on three main factors: (i) the percentage of relevant events, (ii) the fraction of policy-enforcing systems, and (iii) the event frequency. As our experiments show, the decentralized approach performs best for (i) low percentages of relevant events: Fewer relevant events cause fewer policy evaluations and thus fewer state changes to be coordinated; (ii) a low fraction of policy-enforcing systems, thus causing fewer relevant system events and thus fewer policy evaluations and state changes; and (iii) high event frequencies in combination with a low amount of relevant events.
ORTHOGONAL AND FUTURE WORK
Policy Specification and Deployment. We did not discuss particularities of policy specification, translation, and derivation in distributed environments, e.g., which entities should be allowed to specify, deploy, and modify policies for which data. Existing works Kumari and Pretschner 2013 ) focus on single systems only.
Integration with Solutions for Single Systems.
Our approach is compatible with many solutions for single systems (Feth and Pretschner 2012; Wüchner and Pretschner 2012) . It remains to build an encompassing infrastructure that integrates these works, thus allowing for comprehensive intra-system and cross-system usage control enforcement.
Granularity of Dataflow Tracking.
Tracking dataflows on the basis of system calls comes at the cost of overapproximations, since data contents within processes, files, sockets, and so on, cannot be distinguished. Cross-system data flow tracking granularity could be improved by integrating with fine-grained dataflow tracking at the application-layer.
Dedicated Solutions for Distributed Policy Decisions. Cassandra introduces communication overheads even in case no policy coordination is required. It stands to reason that a tailored implementation would significantly improve on these overheads.
RELATED WORK
Usage control was first introduced by Park and Sandhu (2004) , which proposed to evaluate authorizations, obligations, and environmental conditions both before and during the usage of an object. Hilty et al. (2005) generalize this concept to distributed systems, differentiating between observable and non-observable events. Their concepts lay the grounds for preventive and detective policy enforcement ). introduce the Obligation Specification Language, while Pretschner et al. (2008) propose consumer-side enforcement mechanisms. integrate these works with dataflow tracking.
Cross-System Dataflow Tracking and Policy Propagation. Many approaches that track dataflows across systems and propagate policies have limitations not present in our approach: (1) They are hard to deploy in commodity systems: DataSafe Chen et al. (2012) builds on custom hardware; CloudFilter Papagiannis and Pietzuch (2012) and the work by Zhang et al. (2011) necessitate the adaptation of existing applications; Neon (Zhang et al. 2010 ) requires a particular hypervisor. (2) They are tailored to specific application(protocol)s, e.g., CloudFilter and the work by Janicke et al. (2012) . (3) They only support the propagation of labels rather than complex policies, including CloudFence and Taint-Exchange. (4) Last, Taint-Exchange, CloudFence, and Neon are limited in the number of distinct labels or policies that can be tracked.
Decentralized information flow control (DIFC) (Myers and Liskov 1997) prevents information flows from trusted to untrusted data locations. After labelling data and data locations, data may only flow towards higher-labeled locations. Zeldovich et al. (2008) track labels across hosts similar to our approach and determine whether cross-system dataflows are permissible. Data usage control policies can express similar constraints; DIFC mechanisms and their lattice model can be integrated via operator evalExt.
Distributed Policy Decisions. Existing works that aim for the decentralized enforcement of policies impose limitations not present in our approach: (1) For some, the decision process is not entirely distributed, as they rely on single components: For example, Gay et al. (2012) delegate decisions whenever local knowledge is insufficient. Their static mapping of conflicting events to the same automaton introduces a single point of failure. Lazouski et al. (2014) fix one PDP/PIP for the entire lifetime of each datum. (2) Chadwick et al. (2008) and Alzahrani et al. (2010) do not consider dynamic data propagation, thus protecting only static resources. (3) Basin et al. (2013 Basin et al. ( , 2014 Basin et al. ( , 2015 and Bauer and Falcone (2012) focus on the detection of policy violations. Our approach, instead, allows for both preventive and detective enforcement. Similarly to our approach, Basin et al. identify situations in which the evaluation of partial logs suffices because their satisfaction/violation implies satisfaction/violation of the overall log.
Further Approaches. SafeShare Thilakanathan et al. (2013) introduces encrypted containers containing both protected data and policies. Once a user accesses the container, a background process starts and monitors compliance with the policy.
xDUCON Russello and Dulay (2009) enforces data sharing agreements across organizations. It supports ongoing conditions and may revoke access rights during long-lived accesses. Sensitive resources and policies are shared and coordinated via shared storage.
FlowwolF (Hicks et al. 2010) enforces Mandatory Access Control (MAC) for web applications at multiple layers of the software stack. The solution integrates DIFC, MAC reference monitors, and cross-system policy propagation. Our solution is independent of the application layer and enforces more expressive policies even across systems. UCLinux (Kyle and Brustoloni 2007) stores usage controlled files and policies on an encrypted file system. The decryption key is sealed to a trusted TPM configuration, ensuring that it is only accessible to a valid software stack. UCLinux uses a modified version of TLS to perform remote attestation on data distribution.
Securing Data Usage Control
Digital Rights Management. (DRM, e.g., Liu et al. (2003) ) influenced early usage control work by Park and Sandhu (2004) due to the insight that DRM is insufficient if digital media is not only consumed but also re-used, combined, and extended (Iannella 2000) .
DRM primarily aims at the protection of copyrighted content which is encrypted on distribution. Once a user obtains a license, the content is decrypted. Client-side applications enforce compliance with granted usage rights and payment obligations.
The proprietary nature of DRM hinders interoperability and leads to lock-in effects. This was addressed by Koenen et al. (2004) and Taban et al. (2006) . Recently, HTML5 provides interoperable streaming of protected media. Usage control is not limited to proprietary file types and enables the re-use, combination, and extension of data.
CONCLUSIONS
Recently, many works addressed the enforcement of data usage control policies within individual systems. However, the enforcement of policies that refer to data and data usage events that are distributed has not been researched in depth. We overcome the drawbacks of a centralized infrastructure by providing a model, an architecture, and an implementation of a fully decentralized usage control enforcement infrastructure.
Our model allows for the explicit distinction of different systems, their individual behaviors, as well as their interplay. We showed how these individual observations can be reassembled to mimic the behavior of classical centralized systems.
We modeled and implemented the tracking of dataflows across systems in a manner that is independent of file types, applications, protocols, and hardware. By leveraging system call interpositioning techniques, we avoid modifications to applications and the operating system, achieving a throughput of 21-54% of native execution.
Further, we modeled and implemented mechanisms that allow for the fully decentralized, efficient, and preventive enforcement of global data usage policies. We identify systems that are potentially relevant to enforce a given policy, as well as situations in which coordination of policy decisions can be safely omitted. The evaluation revealed that-depending on concrete parameters of the scenario considered-our decentralized approach is able to outperform a centralized approach.
